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THE USE OF QUIET TITLE AND DECLARATORY






Since the advent of microelectronic technology, businesses-whether
organized as large corporations or sole proprietorships-have increasingly
utilized computers to perform countless functions. Businesses invest con-
siderable resources in the development of complex data bases1 and com-
puter software 2 designed to manage the underlying data. As a result, data
bases and software often represent substantial business assets.5 The utiliza-
tion of complex data bases inspires the creation and exploitation of pro-
prietary software, which are computer programs designed or modified for
a specific business entity and purpose.
4
Whether the business utilizes commercial or proprietary packages,
each of the three principle software components-the process, the pro-
gram, and the documentation-represents significant investments of engi-
neering, scientific, and writing skills. 5 Business decision-makers and
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1. Data bases are "[bodies] of information organized in a logical manner such that
[they] can be accessed either randomly and selectively or sequentially by a computer." Robert
C. Dorr & William P. Eigles, Resolving Claims to Ownership of Software and Computer-Stored
Data-The Importance of Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions, 5 COMPUTER/
L.J. 1, 6 (1984).
2. Although commentators recognize that the term "computer software" is not precise,
a well-accepted definition suggests that the following three elements comprise computer
software: (1) the underlying process or "algorithm" upon which the program is based; (2)
the program itself coded in a programming language; and (3) the supporting documenta-
tion, including items such as flow-charts, instruction manuals, and other materials that ex-
plain the operation of the program. Michael S. Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and
Its Protection, 30 EMORY LJ. 483, 484-85 (1981) (citing WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGAN-
IZATION, Pua. No. 814-E, MODEL PROVISIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFrWARE
(1978) [hereinafter MODEL PROVISIONS]). The Supreme Court has defined an algorithm as a
"procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 186 (1981).
3. Jerry R. Selinger, Protecting Computer Software in the Business Environment: Patents, Copy-
rights and Trade Secrets, 3J.L & CoM. 65, 65 (1983).
4. Id.
5. Keplinger, supra note 2, at 486.
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corporate counsel must therefore prepare business and legal plans that
consider the investments made in each of these categories and select legal
mechanisms designed to protect the investments. 6 In the event that the
selected means of protection fails, questions arise concerning "title" to the
software asset.
Software title issues, however, are not limited to claims of misappro-
priation. Specifically, in consideration of the expense associated with de-
veloping and operating proprietary systems, businesses must also establish
software ownership as a preventive measure. Software developers, licen-
sees, and other purported owners therefore regularly seek advice concern-
ing the question of software title. Moreover, although independent
designers fashion proprietary software packages, corporations also develop
proprietary software for internal use, with the potential for sale to third
parties.7 Questions of ownership thus arise from such activities as the
purchase and sale of a corporation or its assets and from legal audits that
reveal a potential conflict with respect to software title.
Computer software is comprised of both symbolic ideas and mechani-
cal objects.8 Unlike ownership disputes concerning real property or other
readily identifiable articles, conflicts involving computer software focus, to
some extent, on intangible property.9 Legal counsel must consider the
technical nature of computer software when selecting the appropriate
method of protecting the client's interest in the software. 10 The technical
complexities associated with computer software also cause problems when
purported software "owners" ask courts, which are consistently pressed for
time and generally unfamiliar with the intricacies of software issues, to re-
solve disputes concerning software title.
This Article considers whether quiet title and declaratory judgment
proceedings constitute effective means of determining ownership to com-
puter software. Section I describes the functions and limitations of three
conventional methods of safeguarding ownership rights to computer
software-patent, copyright, and trade secret protection. Section II sets
forth the factual context of disputes concerning the ownership of com-
puter software. The Article then presents, in Section III, the jurisdictional
6. Id.
7. Selinger, supra note 3, at 65.
8. For a detailed discussion of the "dual nature" of computer software, see Duncan M.
Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 1983 Aiuz. ST. LJ. 611, 616
(1983); see also Raymond G. Areaux, Comment, Computer Software Protection: From Infancy to
Adolescence, 31 Loy. L. Rav. 301, 322 (1985) (noting the courts' confusion concerning the
dual nature of software). Moreover, as one commentator noted:
Technology has blurred the once-clear line between hardware and software with
"firmware," a hardware element, generally a semi-conductor chip, combined with
software, such as a program coded into the chip's memory matrix, to produce a
hybrid .... In their various forms, these devices perform a variety of functions,
from storing programs and memory for electronic games to speeding up the opera-
tion of a large mainframe.
Joseph E. Root III, Protecting Computer Software in the '80s: Practical Guidelines for Evolving Needs,
8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 205, 208 (1981) (citations omitted).
9. An in-depth presentation of the technical issues associated with computer software is
beyond the scope of this article.
10. See Areaux, supra note 8, at 322.
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and procedural issues associated with quiet tide actions. Section IV con-
siders the potential use and effectiveness of the declaratory judgment ac-
tion in computer software disputes. The Article concludes that the
declaratory judgment action and the quiet title action, as framed in the
jurisdictions allowing the procedure to encompass personal property
claims, present viable alternatives to resolving ownership disputes concern-
ing computer software.
I. TRADITIONAL METHODS OF PROTECTING COMPUTER SoFrWARE
Advocates for protecting computer software from misappropriation
or for otherwise clarifying title to software-whether the individual advo-
cate recommends patent, copyright, or trade secret protection-must ad-
dress an underlying policy question. 1 Simply stated, software developers
and other owners must determine which legal mechanism, or combina-
tion of mechanisms, 12 best protects their expensive technological invest-
ment without sacrificing incentives for future development or sanctioning
the anti-competitive protection of socially valuable ideas.13 Any appropri-
ate protective scheme must adequately balance the social interest in the
complete dissemination of technological information against the often
competing economic interest in protecting property against
misappropriation. 14
A. Patent Protection for Computer Software
1. Statutory Requirements and Jurisdiction
Patent law theoretically provides the broadest scope' 5 of protection
for computer software because patents encompass both the develop-
ment and use of the software product.1 6 Federal law essentially gives
the patentee a statutorily prescribed, seventeen-year monopoly on
11. Generally, intellectual property rights are, by nature, "negative rights" that allow
owners to prevent others from: (1) making, using, or selling the protected product (patent);
(2) copying the protected item (copyright); and (3) improperly obtaining secret business
information (trade secret).
As discussed below, patents and copyrights effectively license the software "owner" to
monopolize the use of the software product. In contrast, trade secret law protects confiden-
tial business information that provides a competitive advantage.
12. See David A. Einhorn, Copyright and Patent Protection for Computer Software: Are They
Mutually Exclusive, 30 IDEAJ.L. & TECH. 265 (1990) (stating that an analysis of relevant law
reveals no sound justification for denying joint patent and copyright protection for computer
software that is otherwise independently eligible for both forms of protection).
13. Davidson, supra note 8, at 634.
14. Areaux, supra note 8, at 311.
15. The broad scope of patent protection originates in the United States Constitution,
which empowered Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress invoked this power by enacting
patent statutes protecting inventors from the unauthorized use of their discoveries. 35
U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988). The copyright statutes, as codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988),
protect the writings of authors.
16. Vibert L. Kesler & David E. Hardy, Legal Protection of Software in the United States: A
Status Report, 10 Irrr'L Bus. LAw. 266, 267 (1982); see Selinger, supra note 3, at 66.
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the rights to make, use, or sell the patented invention.' 7 In order to
qualify for this protection, an invention must be "new and useful,"' 8
"novel," 19 and "non-obvious."20 In addition, the applicant must satisfy
several procedural requirements before the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) will issue the requested patent.2 1 The federal
17. The statute provides in relevant part:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee
•.. for the term of seventeen years... of the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the invention throughout the United States, and, if the invention is
a process, of the right to exclude others from using or selling throughout the
United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that process
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) (footnotes omitted). This statutory prohibition applies to "copyists"
and persons who independently conceive of the patented invention. Selinger, supra note 3,
at 66 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974)).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) provides that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this tide."
19. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) provides in part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or
a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the sub-
ject of an inventor's certificate, by the applicant... in a foreign country prior to the
date of the application for patent in this country on an application for patent or
inventor's certificate filed more than twelve months before the filing of the applica-
tion in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for pat-
ent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the appli-
cant for patent... or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this
country by another ....
20. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) provides in part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988) provides in part:
Application for patent shall be made, or authorized to be made, by the inven-
tor.., in writing to the Commissioner. Such application shall include (1) a specifi-
cation as prescribed by section 112 of this title; (2) a drawing as prescribed by
section 113 of this tide; and (3) an oath by the applicant as prescribed by section
115 of this tide. The application must be accompanied by the fee required by
law.... Upon failure to submit the fee and oath within [the] prescribed period, the
application shall be regarded as abandoned, unless it is shown.., that the delay in
submitting the fee and oath was unavoidable. The filing date of an application shall
be the date on which the specification and any required drawing are received in the
Patent and Trademark Office.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) provides in relevant part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 113-15 (1988).
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Initially, software developers seeking patent protection for computer
software faced a seemingly insurmountable obstacle in the form of an
early determination by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA) 24 and PTO that computer programs were unpatentable "mental
steps."25 The United States Supreme Court basically strengthened that
finding when it first visited the matter of the patentability of computer
software in 1972. In Gottschalk v. Benson,2 6 the Court held that a patent
claim relating to a method of converting one form of numerical represen-
tation to another was not a patentable "process" within the meaning of
Section 101 of the Patent Act.27 The patent claim was not limited to any
particular art, technology, machinery, or end use, and purportedly cov-
ered any use of the method in a general-purpose digital computer. 28 The
Court reasoned that a patent on the method of applying the algorithm
would "wholly preempt the mathematical formula and in practical effect
would be a patent on the algorithm itself."2 9 After Benson, the Supreme
Court issued two other opinions concerning software issues, Dann v. John-
ston3 ° and Parker v. F/ook,3 1 both of which made a significant impact on the
area of software patents.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents. ....
copyrights, and trademarks."
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988) (patent infringement).
24. Prior to the creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
1982, the CCPA was the federal appellate court maintaining jurisdiction over the Patent Of-
fice. Since the district courts and their respective circuit courts of appeals heard suits for
patent infringement, the non-uniformity of decisions in the circuits produced considerable
"forum shopping" and concomitant uncertainty. The creation of the Federal Circuit elimi-
nated conflicts between the circuits and reduced the need for Supreme Court certiorari re-
view. PETER B. MACGS ET AL., COMPUTER LAw: CASES-COMMENTs-QUESTIONS 186 (1992).
25. The "mental steps doctrine" provides that "claims to mental concepts which consti-
tute the very substance of an alleged invention are not patentable .... It is self-evident that
thought is not patentable." In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168 (C.C.P.A. 1951). In order to
circumvent the mental steps limitation, developers often acquired patent protection by unit-
ing the computer hardware and software components and claiming that the combination was
a patentable invention. Areaux, supra note 8, at 311.
26. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
27. Id. at 71-72. The claim in question related to a method for converting binary-coded
decimal numbers into equivalent pure binary numbers. Id. at 64-66.
28. Id. at 64. The Court stated that the applicants' process claim was "so abstract and
sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the [conversion method]." Id. at 68.
29. Id. at 72. The Court expressly restricted its holding to the particular facts of the case
to avoid stating a general rule. Davidson, supra note 8, at 636; see Benson, 409 U.S. at 71 ("We
do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of
our prior precedents .... We have, however, made clear from the start that we deal with a
program only for digital computers."). The Benson Court also relied on the Report of the
President's Commission on the Patent System, which cited the inability of the Patent Office
to examine program patent applications and recommended against the patentability of com-
puter programs. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72-73.
30. 425 U.S. 219 (1976). In Johnston, the Court reversed the CCPA, which found that
the bank record keeping system was patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at
1994]
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The most recent Supreme Court case concerning an attempt to ob-
tain a process patent for an invention that could be implemented in whole
or in part by computer software involved a process for curing synthetic
rubber that utilized a mathematical formula and a programmed digital
computer. In the landmark case of Diamond v. Diehr,3 2 the Court reviewed
Benson and Hook and held that mathematical formulas alone do not war-
rant the protection of federal patent law,33 a principle which one could
not circumvent by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particu-
lar application.a
4
The Court concluded, however, that the Diehr applicants sought pat-
ent protection for an industrial process, not a mathematical formula.
3 5
The applicants argued that they only desired to foreclose others from the
use of the equation insofar as it was a part of the other steps in their
claimed process.3 6 The Supreme Court allowed the patent to issue and
established that claims which implement or apply mathematical formulas
in a process that, considered as a whole, performs a function that the pat-
ent laws were designed to protect, satisfy the requirements of Section 101
of the patent laws.
3 7
3. Patent Licensing
Not every patent owner retains the monopolistic rights in an inven-
tion for the statutorily protected seventeen-year-period. A patent owner
may enter into a license agreement, which formally evidences the com-
plete or partial surrender of the rights in the invention to the licensee.
3 8
Although a patent license agreement necessarily involves the application
230. The CCPA narrowly interpreted Benson by distinguishing apparatus claims from process
claims. See In reJohnston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974). Over strong dissents, the CCPA
continued to narrowly construe Benson in subsequent program patent claims. See In re Chat-
field, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (Benson only precluded
process inventions where the claim would preempt all uses of an algorithm or mathematical
formula); In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141 (C.C.PA 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (distin-
guishing apparatus claims from process claims). Without addressing the issue of whether the
program was patentable subject matter under Section 101, the Johnston Court disposed of the
case by holding that the invention was "obvious" and therefore unpatentable pursuant to
Section 103. Id. at 149.
31. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). In Rook, the patent applicant sought patent protection, pur-
portedly within the guidelines established in Benson, for a mathematical formula covering a
narrowly defined range of potential uses. The Court was presented with the specific question
of whether the identification of a limited category of useful, though conventional, "post-
solution" applications of a formula allowed patent protection. Id. at 585. The Court rejected
the applicant's argument that the identification of post-solution activity distinguished the
claim from Benson and determined that the only novelty was the algorithm. I1. at 586. Ac-
cording to the Court, "[t]he notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or
obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts
form over substance." Id. at 590.
32. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
33. 1d. at 191.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 187.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 192.
38. See ROBERT C. DoRt & CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS, PAT-
ENTS, CoPYRIGHTs, AND TRADEMAR S § 5.9, at 202 (1990) (defined in the context of copyright
[Vol. 71:3
COMPUTER SOFTWARE OWNERSHIP DISPUTES
of the statutory rights to the underlying patent, such an agreement is not
grounded in statute.3 9 The patent license is a creature of common law
and remains governed by general principles of state contract law.
40
A patent owner may grant an exclusive or non-exclusive license. 4 1 An
agreement conveying exclusive rights to a transferee, short of an assign-
ment of full ownership, constitutes an "exclusive license."4 2 In contrast, a
"non-exclusive" patent license is generally issued to a number of different
entities43 and constitutes only an assurance of immunity from suit with
respect to acts completed within the scope of the license.
44
Whether a patent owner should grant an exclusive or non-exclusive
license depends on several factors, including the nature of the invention
and the extent to which the owner desires to market the product incorpo-
rating the patented invention. An exclusive license generally commands
higher payments or royalties,4 5 but over-all marketing conditions often
make the granting of several non-exclusive licenses desirable to the patent-
holder.
The patent licensor and licensee should both follow several practical
guidelines when entering a license agreement. First, prior to negotiations,
the licensor must investigate the financial and litigation history of the po-
tential licensee.4 6 Second, the licensor must offer a presentation of the
licensed subject matter, including the results of the patent search and a
copy of the patent application. 47 Third, the licensor must articulate its
goals for licensing in the context of the relevant product and geographical
markets. 48 Finally, the licensor should also clearly document performance
licenses). The license simply constitutes either an oral or written grant of permission to use
the otherwise exclusive work. Id.
39. RAYMOND C. NoaRnIrAus, PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS: LAW AND FoRMs 2 (1967).
40. Id. (citing L.L. Brown Paper Co. v. Hydroiloid, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 857, 868 (S.D.N.Y.
1939)).
41. Id. at 3; see DoRa & MUNCH, supra note 38, § 2.34, at 92. Although the most common
practice involves the grant of a license under an issued patent, a patent applicant may also
properly assign or license rights to an invention prior to issuance by the Patent and Trade-
mark Office. No.DnHAus, supra note 39, at 3.
42. HARRY R. MAYERs & BRIAN G. BRUNSVOLD, DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 39
(2d ed. 1984). Cf DoRa & MUNCH, supra note 38, at 92 ("Exclusive licenses are akin to actual
assignments and, in some cases, an exclusive license may constitute an actual assignment of
the invention.").
43. DoiR & MUNCH, supra note 38, § 2.34, at 92.
44. MAYERs & BRUNSVOLD, supra note 42, at 31-32. The term "cross-license" describes a
reciprocal agreement in which (1) Party A grants a license to Party B and (2) at least part of
the consideration provided by Party B is a license to Party A under Party B's patents. Id. at 35.
The related term "package license" refers to the grant of rights associated with two or more
patents in a single license agreement. See genera//y NoRDHAus, supra note 39, at 29-38.
45. DoRR & MUNCH, supra note 38, at 92. In a patent license agreement, the licensor
may seek payment in the form of a lump sum, royalty, installments, or a combination of the
three. Id. at 93. Payments may also be tied to a number of factors including manufacturing
quality, sales to wholesalers, and retail sales. Id.
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standards and consider imposing penalties upon the failure of the licensee
to effectively exploit the market.
49
The licensee should also investigate several potential problem areas
before entering a license agreement. The licensee should conduct an in-
dependent patentability and infringement search and retain counsel to
analyze the results of the search and the entire PTO file of the patent.
50
The licensee should secure the relevant warranties of ownership and ob-
tain a clear definition of terms from the licensor, including the market,
territory and product specifications. 5 1 Finally, the licensee must review all
payment obligations and allow enough time to comply procedurally with
the payment terms.52 If the parties investigate these areas of concern and
document their respective expectations of performance prior to entering
the license agreement, they may successfully avoid, or at least reduce the
expenses of, subsequent litigation concerning the terms of the license.
53
4. Patent Summary
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the patent-
ability of computer software, Diehr extended patent protection to the
processes underlying computer programs, provided that the algorithm
constitutes only part of the patentable invention. 54 It follows that software
owners may bring claims for patent infringement if the invention satisfies
the statutory criteria. Since the Court rarely addresses the patentability of
computer program inventions, however, the rulings of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit will continue to influence decisions by busi-
nesses concerning the appropriate means of protecting proprietary
software.5 5 Accordingly, attorneys should follow the practical guidelines
prepared by the PTO, which are derived from the holdings of the Federal
Circuit, concerning the patentability of mathematical algorithms and com-
puter programs.
56
49. See id. at 95-96 (setting forth several additional considerations relevant to the licens-
ing context).
50. Id. at 96.
51. d. at 97.
52. Id.
53. For detailed drafting considerations, see MAFvxs & BRUNSVOLD, supra note 42;
NORDHAus, supra note 39.
54. Id.; see aLso In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.PA. 1979), afftd, 450 U.S. 381 (1981)
(recognizing a patent claim for software that enhanced the operation of a computer).
55. See Keplinger, supra note 2, at 492. Before a patent issues, and if no patent issues on
an application, the PTO holds the patent application in confidence. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1988).
The disclosure requirements associated with issued patents, however, may reveal previously
protected trade secrets. The patent process, therefore, remains unattractive to software de-
velopers skeptical of a method whereby the protected information becomes available for pub-
lic inspection upon issuance. Kesler & Hardy, supra note 16, at 267.
56. See MAGcs ET AL., supra note 24, at 265.
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B. Copyright Protection for Computer Software
1. Statutory Requirements and Jurisdiction
Modern copyright protection developed from the common law right
of an author to receive the benefits derived from the first publication of
the work. By statute, the author of a copyrightable "writing" must register
the original work57 with the federal Copyright Office in accordance with
Sections 701 and 702 of the Copyright Act.5 8 The copyright grants the
author a limited monopoly59 on copying rights and other specified acts,
but does not preclude independent origination by another individual. 60
The copyright only protects the author's tangible expression; it does not
extend to underlying ideas, processes, systems, or methods of operation.
61
Using a common analogy for illustrative purposes, Leonardo da Vinci
would hold the exclusive rights to publish copies of the Mona Lisa. The
copyright protection, however, would extend only to the picture itself, not
the idea behind the painting. Another artist could publish a different in-
terpretation of the concept, and that publication would receive federal
copyright protection upon creation.
62
The author must also comply with several notice, deposit and registra-
tion requirements. 63 The author provides notice of the reservation of
rights by inscribing each copy of the work with the word "copyright" or the
symbol "©", accompanied by the author's name and date of reservation.64
The basic methodology of actually enforcing the licensed protection
under copyright law parallels that of patent law. A claim of copyright in-
fringement will not automatically invoke federal jurisdiction when the in-
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1992). Although copyright in a work tech-
nically subsists upon creation, the copyright legislation provides significant incentives for re-
gistration. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (infringer pays reasonable attorney's fees), § 504 (providing
statutory damages in lieu of actual damages), § 411 (copyright registration required before
author may initiate suit for infringement); see also Selinger, supra note 3, at 77-78.
58. 17 U.S.C. §§ 701-02 (1988 & Supp. III 1992).
59. For works created after 1977, copyright protection is extended for the author's life-
time plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. III 1992) provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copy-
righted work publicly.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
62. For a historical illustration of this concept, see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)
(copyright on book did not convey the exclusive right to use the bookkeeping concept ex-
plained in the copyrighted work).
63. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-12 (1988 & Supp. III 1992); 37 C.F.R. §§ 201.20, 202.2 (1992).
64. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-06 (1988 & Supp. III 1992).
1994]
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fringement is merely incidental to the primary dispute over the ownership
right.
6 5
Since Congress did not license the judiciary to grant extra-statutory
relief in these matters, courts have generally concluded that Congress in-
tended to limit the remedies of aggrieved copyright holders to those pro-
vided in Sections 501-510 of the Copyright Act, including actions for
copyright infringement. 66 The courts reason that remedies not expressly
provided by the copyright statutes are remedies not intended.
6 7
2. Legislative Developments
Congress secured for authors the exclusive rights to their respective
writings by enacting the Copyright Act of 1909.68 The Copyright Office
subsequently announced guidelines governing the registration of com-
puter programs in 1964, even though it was still unclear whether com-
puter software was a copyrightable "writing" under the original
legislation. 69 Congress considerably broadened the registration guide-
lines by enacting the Copyright Act of 1976,70 which suggested that com-
puter software was eligible for copyright protection. 7 1 The 1976 Act,
however, did not specifically prescribe that computer software was copy-
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988).
66. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1542, 1549 (N.D. Cal.
1990). Moreover, Section 701 of the Copyright Act provides that "[alU administrative func-
tions and duties under this title, except as otherwise specified, are the responsibility of the
Register of Copyrights as director of the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress." 17
U.S.C. § 701 (1988). Section 702 authorizes the Copyright Office to establish regulations for
the administration of its functions and duties. 17 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
67. Xerox, 734 F. Supp. at 1549.
68. See U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
69. The Copyright Office announced the guidelines in accordance with its policy of
resolving questionable issues in favor of registration. See OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF CoPY-
RIGHTS, ANNOuNCEMENT SML-47 (May 1964). The Copyright Office accepted approximately
2,000 programs for registration under the 1909 Act between 1964 and 1977, most of which
were registered by two mainframe manufacturers-IBM and Burroughs. Davidson, supra
note 8, at 652 n.72 (citing CONTU FINAL REPORT at 38, 85 (July 31, 1978)) [hereinafter
CONTU REPORT].
70. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2565 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988)).
71. Dorr & Eigles, supra note 1, at 8. The original legislation incorporated the Supreme
Court's decision in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) by
providing that imperceptible forms of work were not copyrightable. See Davidson, supra note
8, at 652-53. Section 102(a) of the 1976 Act, however, broadened the subject matter of copy-
right protection. That section provides:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
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rightable subject matter. As a result, the courts failed to reach a consensus
with respect to the nature and scope of copyright protection for computer
programs.
72
Copyright protection for computer software remained problematic
until Congress, acting on the recommendation of the National Commis-
sion on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU),
7 3
passed the Software Protection Act of 1980, 74 which included provisions
specifically extending copyright protection to computer programs.7 5 The
1980 amendments plainly applied to software represented in "source
code," but failed to address potential copyright questions concerning
other forms of software translations. The courts were therefore required
to resolve the question of whether copyright protection extended to com-
puter programs expressed in binary form or "object code."
76
3. Significant Decisions
Notwithstanding the seemingly broad reach of the copyright statutes,
questions continually arise concerning the scope of copyright protection
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. III 1992).
72. Dorr & Eigles, supra note 1, at 7 (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc.,
562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), afTd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984)).
73. For an overview of the development of copyright protection for computer software,
see John T. Soma et al., A Proposed Legal Advisor's Roadmap for Software Developers: On the Shoul-
ders of Giants May No Breachers of Economic Relationships nor Slavish Copiers Stand, 68 DENy. U. L.
REV. 191 (1991).
74. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988)).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) provides that "[a] 'computer program' is a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of an-
other copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it
is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all
archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the
computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this sec-
tion may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from
which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other trans-
fer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred
only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 79-90. "Object code" refers to the numerical lan-
guage designed as the mechanical apparatus for operating a machine. See Davidson, supra
note 8, at 620-21.
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for computer software. 77 The cases concerning the copyright protection
of computer software fall into three generations or waves.
78
The first generation of cases addressed the copying of substantial por-
tions of literal software elements, including object and source codes. In
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 79 the Third Circuit held that
computer software, whether an operating system program or application
program expressed in object code or source code, constituted a literary
work within the scope of copyright protection.8 0 The court noted that the
1980 amendment to the Copyright Act firmly established the copyright-
ability of computer programs8 l and, citing the plain language of the Copy-
right Act and its legislative history, the court soundly rejected the alleged
source code-object code distinction.
8 2
77. In a copyright infringement action, the plaintiff must establish: (1) ownership of a
valid copyright; and (2) that the defendant copied the protected work. 3 MELVILLE B. NIM-
MER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPRIGHT § 13.01, at 13-5 (1992). The plaintiff may prove
the copying element either through direct evidence of the copying or by showing that: (1)
the defendant had access to the plaintiff's copyrighted work; and (2) the defendant's work
was substantially similar to the plaintiffs copyrighted work. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d
44, 48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986)). See also Warner Bros. v. American Broad-
casting Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1981); Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams,
Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 990 (D. Conn. 1989).
78. Soma et al, supra note 73, at 198 (describing several cases in each "generation" and
the potential impact of the respective holdings on software development and protection); see
David Bender, Computer Associates v. Altai: Rationality Prevails, COMPUTER LAW., Aug. 1992 at
2,3.
79. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984)..
80. Id. at 1249. The appellate court also reversed the district court's ruling concerning
irreparable harm. Although Apple occupied a more favorable financial position than Frank-
lin, the Third Circuit observed that Apple's ability to withstand lost sales did not outweigh the
strong presumption in copyright cases that any copying causes irreparable harm. ld. at 1254.
Apple sought a preliminary injunction to restrain Franklin from using, copying, selling,
or otherwise infringing Apple's copyrights to fourteen computer programs. Id. at 1245. The
disputed software consisted of various operating system programs, which generally manage
the internal functions of the computer or facilitate the use of application programs. MAGs
ET AL., supra note 24, at 6. The district court denied Apple's motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion based, in significant part, on the view that operating system programs, in binary form,
were not the proper subject of copyright protection. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
The district court also determined that Apple failed to establish the "irreparable harm"
requisite to the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Ia at 825. Although Franklin admit-
tedly copied the operating system programs in an effort to manufacture and market "Apple-
compatible" hardware, it defended the suit on the ground that the Apple programs, which
were expressed in object code, were not subject to copyright protection. Franklin, 714 F.2d at
1245.
81. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1248 (citing Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870
(3d Cir. 1982)).
82. Id. Franklin also argued that an operating system program, in contrast to an applica-
tion program, constitutes a process, system or method of operation that was per se excluded
from copyright protection by the express terms of Section 102(b). Id. at 1250. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1988) excludes from copyright protection any "idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
The court also noted that Section 102(b) codified a substantial part of the holding and
dictum of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), which held that copyright of a book did not
grant the copyright owner the exclusive right to use the system explained in the book. Frank-
lin, 714 F.2d at 1250. The court, however, determined that Franklin misconstrued the dis-
tinction between patentable and copyrightable subject matter. Id at 1250-51. The court
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In the second generation, the courts considered the extent to which
the non-literal aspects of computer software, including the structure, se-
quence and organization (SSO) of programs, received copyright protec-
tion. In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,83 a software
copyright case, the Third Circuit established a test for distinguishing non-
copyrightable idea from copyrightable expression.8 4 The court concluded
that the purpose or function of a computer program or other utilitarian
work constitutes the idea, and the elements of the work unnecessary to the
central purpose comprise copyrightable expression.8 5 Where various
means of achieving the desired purpose exist, the particular method uti-
lized by the developer becomes the copyrightable expression.8 6 The court
held that after isolating the idea-the primary purpose of the software-
copyright protection clearly extended beyond the literal code to the struc-
ture, sequence and organization of the program.
8 7
In a recent second generation case, Computer Associates International,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,8 8 the Second Circuit presented an alternative analytical
framework for distinguishing idea from expression and determining the
substantial similarity of non-literal program structures.8 9 When the court
faced the threshold obstacle of separating non-copyrightable idea from
observed that Apple did not seek to copyright the method that instructs the computer to
perform operating functions, but rather the instructions themselves. Id. at 1251. The court
stated that Franklin's challenge with respect to operating system programs as 'methods' or
'processes' seemed inconsistent with its concession that application programs were properly
copyrightable because both types of programs instruct the computer to perform tasks. I.
Furthermore, the court found no statutory distinction between operating and application
programs and rejected Franklin's argument for limiting copyright protection by program
function. Id.
83. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
84. See i. at 1235-38.
85. Id. at 1236. The court noted that "[t] his test is necessarily difficult to state, and it may
be difficult to understand in the abstract." Id. at 1236 n.28.
DefendantJaslow, with access to plaintiff Whelan's source code for a computer program
designed for dental laboratory operations, developed and distributed a similar program in
another programming language. Id. at 1225-27. Utilizing the court's test, the efficient man-
agement of a dental laboratory comprised the idea of the program. Id. at 1236 n.28.
86. I. at 1236.
87. Id. at 1237-39. Although Whelan's framework for dissecting the software develop-
ment process into its component parts remains useful to the idea/expression determination,
the "idea equals purpose" rule proves unworkable in cases involving complex programs. See
Bender, supra note 78, at 3 ("The Whelan distinction rule was so weighted toward the idea
end of the spectrum as to render the framework generally useless.").
88. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
89. Id. at 706. The case developed after Altai recruited a Computer Associates (CA)
employee to assist in designing a new version of an Altai program. Id. at 699. The former CA
employee was "intimately familiar with various aspects of Adapter." Id. Moreover, the em-
ployee knowingly violated his contractual agreement with CA by removing copies of the
source code for both the VSE and MVS versions of Adapter. Id. at 699-70. The employee
developed a counterpart to Computer Associates' "Adapter" program for use in Altai's pack-
age by copying, without Altai's knowledge, portions of the Adapter source code. I. at 700.
Altai marketed the resulting program, which was entitled "Oscar 3.4," as a component of
its software package. Id. After learning of the misappropriation, however, Altai initiated a
rewrite using clean-room conditions whereby the copied portions of Adapter were excised
from the remainder of the Oscar 3.4 program. Id.
Computer Associates maintained that, despite Altai's rewrite of the Oscar code, the re-
sulting program-entitled "Oscar 3.5"-remained substantially similar to the structure of its
Adapter program. I. at 702. Specifically, Computer Associates alleged copying based upon
1994]
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copyrightable expression, it rejected the Whelan model of equating pur-
pose and idea because the test relied heavily on metaphysical distinctions
without placing enough emphasis on practical considerations.9 0
The court instead adopted a three-step analysis for determining
whether the non-literal elements of two or more computer programs were
substantially similar.9 1 First, the court reduced the allegedly infringing
program to its constituent parts by isolating each level of abstraction.92 In
this abstraction process, the court retraced each step in the design process
to identify the ultimate function of the program.93 In the second step-
the filtration process-the court removed the non-copyrightable material
including incorporated ideas, expressions incidental to the ideas and ele-
ments derived from the public domain. 94 The third and final element of
the test constituted the search for impermissible copying and required a
comparison of the remaining core of potentially protectable expression
with the structure of the allegedly infringing program. 95 Applying this test
to the structural components of Oscar 3.5, the court held that the evi-
dence failed to establish the degree of substantial similarity requisite to a
finding of copyright infringement.
96
The third generation of software copyright cases further extended
protection to non-literal elements, often focusing on the user interface.
97
In Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International,98 the court ad-
dressed whether the non-literal elements of a computer program, particu-
larly the program's user interface, were copyrightable.99 The Lotus court
refused to adopt a bright-line rule, choosing instead to develop another
three-part balancing test to determine the copyrightability of non-literal
components of computer software. The court first identified the underly-
ing idea of the program for the purpose of distinguishing between the
the substantial similarity of several non-literal program components (including flow charts,
macros, lists of parameters and services) and the specific organization of modules. Id.
90. Id. at 706.
91. Id. The Second Circuit's "abstraction-filtration-comparison test" was based in part
on the abstractions test set forth in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). Id.
92. Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 707.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 707-10.
95. Id. at 710-11.
96. Id. at 715. Specifically, the court found that the evidence failed to establish that the
macros and parameter lists of the allegedly infringing Oscar 3.5 program were substantially
similar to CA-Adapter. Moreover, the list of services was dictated by the nature of other
programs with which it was designed to interact, and the respective programs' organizational
charts were so simple and obvious that copyright protection could not attach. Id. For a
detailed discussion of the Second Circuit's analysis, see Bender, supra note 78.
97. For an extensive analysis of the important software copyright cases, see Soma et al.,
supra note 73, at 198.
98. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
99. Id. at 42. Specifically, the issues presented to the Lotus court concerned: (1)
whether and to what extent Lotus's spreadsheet program, "Lotus 1-2-3," was copyrightable;
and (2) whether Paperback's competing program, "VP-Planner," infringed the copyrighted
expression in Lotus 1-2-3 by impermissibly incorporating substantially similar elements. I.
The court focused on whether the non-literal elements of the program, including its overall
organization, the structure of the command system and the presentation of information on
the computer screen, were copyrightable subject matter. Id. at 46.
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idea and the expression allegedly infringed.1° ° Second, the court sepa-
rated the expression from the idea and evaluated the individual elements
of expression comprising the work to determine whether the expression
was part of the public domain or otherwise limited to the functional re-
quirements of the work. 10 1 Finally, the court determined whether the
copyrightable expression identified in the second step constituted a sub-
stantial part of the product allegedly infringed.
10 2
4. Cancellation of Copyrights
Congress empowered the Copyright Office with the authority to can-
cel, as well as to grant, copyright protection. The Code of Federal Regula-
tions describes the circumstances under which the Copyright Office will
cancel a registration.10 3 When the Copyright Office discovers after regis-
tration that a work is not copyrightable, either because the authorship is de
minimis or the work does not contain authorship subject to copyright, it
may cancel the registration.
10 4
Although the threat of copyright invalidation would seem to present
an effective deterrent to copyright misappropriation, the Copyright Office
presently has no procedures for adjudicating factual controversies be-
tween parties. In the comments accompanying the proposed cancellation
regulation, the Copyright Office explained that, as a general rule, it will
initiate cancellation procedures only upon the discovery of a material er-
ror in the registration. 10 5 Since the Office is not prepared to resolve dis-
putes concerning software ownership, aggrieved parties must resort to
traditional infringement actions to adjudicate their respective claims.
5. Copyright Licensing
A developer or other owner of a marketable computer program gen-
erally distributes software packages for use under a licensing agree-
ment.10 6 The license operates pursuant to state law and formally
evidences the complete or partial relinquishment of the copyright owner's
exclusive rights.' 0 7 The copyright owner may grant a licensee the exclu-
100. Id. at 60. In reaching this threshold determination through an abstraction analysis,
the decision-maker focused "upon alternatives that counsel may suggest, or the court may
conceive, along the scale from the most generalized conception to the most particularized,
and choose some formulation [of idea]." Id.
101. Id. at 60-61. The court stated that "the decision-maker must focus upon whether an
alleged expression of the idea is limited to elements essential to expression of that idea (or is
one of only a few ways of expressing the idea) or instead includes identifiable -elements of
expression not essential to every expression of that idea." Id.
102. Id. at 60-61.
103. 57 C.F.R. § 201.7 (1988).
104. 37 C.F.R. § 201.7(c)(1) (1988).
105. The Copyright Office added that it "does not invite, and will generally not respond
favorably to, requests to cancel a complete registration by a party other than the owner of the
copyright."
106. Copyright owners receive royalties in exchange for the grant of technological and
economic benefits associated with the license.
107. See DoR & MuNcH, supra note 38, § 5.9, at 202. The license is simply either an oral
or written grant of permission to use the otherwise exclusive work. Id.
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sive right to use the software product for a defined period of time or
within a given area.10 8 One benefit of an exclusive license is the licensee's
standing to bring suit against infringers of the underlying copyright.
10 9
Although the licensee is not required to record the license as a prerequi-
site to initiating an infringement action under the Berne Convention Im-
plementation Act of 1988,110 recordation provides constructive notice of
ownership.11
Many of the issues associated with the types and terms of copyright
licenses mirror those discussed in the context of patent license agree-
ments. 1 12 Perhaps the most common form of license outside of the mass-
market context is the non-exclusive right to use the copyrighted work
either for a single use or for inclusion in a single work. 113 Unlike the
owner of an exclusive license, however, the owner of a non-exclusive li-
cense does not have the right to bring suit against infringers. 1 4 More-
over, the owner of a non-exclusive license must operate within the
limitations of the license to avoid a potential infringement claim by the
copyright owner. 115 Both parties to the license agreement, however, may
greatly reduce the potential for litigation by following general licensing
practice guidelines, including the investigation of financial histories, defi-
nition of product and geographical markets and documentation of per-
formance standards, warranties of ownership and payment terms.
1 16
6. Copyright Summary
Unlike patent law, the statutory scheme of copyright protection only
prohibits copying, not independent creation by another person or en-
tity. 117 Modern copyright law thus affords considerable protection for
computer software as literary works of authorship, whether utilized as a
distinct alternative or a supplement to patent protection."18 The benefits
of copyright protection include both the relatively low cost of obtaining
the copyright and the normally straightforward and expeditious registra-
tion process.
19
The copyright protects the specific expression of an idea, not the idea
itself,' 2 0 and, in the case of a dispute, the copyright owner has the burden
108. Id. at 203.
109. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1988)).
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1988).
111. DoRR & MUNCH, supra note 38, at 203. The Berne Convention Implementation Act
also makes it unnecessary to register a copyright; however, unless and until the copyright
owner registers the copyright, the licensee may not record the exclusive license or other
instrument of transfer. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)(2) (1988).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 38-53.
113. DoRR & MUNCH, supra note 38, at 202.
114. Id. at 203. The recordation of a non-exclusive license would therefore serve no seri-
ous purpose.
115. Id.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53.
117. Selinger, supra note 3, at 74.
118. See generally Einhorn, supra note 12.
119. Selinger, supra note 3, at 77.
120. 1d. at 74.
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of establishing unauthorized copying. 12 1 The benefits of copyright protec-
tion are reduced if the underlying idea represents the greatest value in the
program and the form of expression (i.e., the specific program language)
is easily circumvented.1 22 If the value of the software resides in the partic-
ular form of expression, the copyright statutes generally provide the great-
est protection.'
23
Despite the facial simplicity of the tests utilized in Lotus and the other
copyright infringement cases, the complexities associated with computer
software blur the boundary separating non-copyrightable idea and copy-
rightable expression. 12 4 The resulting imperfections of line-drawing and
uncertainty associated with ad hoc judicial determinations may lead
software developers to secure complementary patent protection for com-
plex programs despite the complicated procedures and increased
expense. 1
2 5
Counsel to software developers should encourage clients to reduce
potential infringement claims by following several routine procedures.
First, counsel should alert developers of the idea-expression dichotomy,
and suggest that software developers appropriately document the reasons:
(1) why they wrote the software in the manner in which it was written; (2)
why certain design decisions were made; and (3) why some decision
choices were limited to a few or even one option. 12 6 In addition, if a de-
velopment involves a software application similar to an existing program,
counsel should determine whether any pre-existing economic relationship
exists in order to identify and act to prevent attempts to obtain colorable
title. 127 Finally, counsel should ensure that software developers do not
merely clone existing programs, but instead seek to improve an existing
product with substantially independent work.
128
C. Trade Secret Protection for Computer Software
1. Definition and Application
Although the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 129 modified the definition, a
trade secret generally comprises any "formula, pattern, device or compila-
121. Id. at 75.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Judge Learned Hand once stated that "nobody has ever been able to fix [the] bound-
ary [between idea and expression], and nobody ever can." Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). Sixty-three years
later, Judge Hand's statement holds true.
125. See Summary of Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14305, 10 CoMPUTER LAw MoNrOR 510, 511 (1992).
126. Soma et al., supra note 73, at 226.
127. Id.
128. Id.; see Margaret L. Pittman, What the Judge Sees is What You Get: The Implications of
Lotus v. Paperback for Software Copyright, 37 WAYNE L. Rxv. 1527, 1573-75 (1991). In light of
the Lotus decision, the author suggests "the cautious use of 'clean room' techniques, compe-
tition on the basis of performance rather than compatibility, and the security of a develop-
ment license." 1d. at 1575.
129. UNIFORM Tt DE SEcETms Acr, § 1(4), 14 U.LA. 541 (1980) [hereinafter UNIFORM
Acr].
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tion of information" used in business that provides the owner with an op-
portunity to obtain a competitive advantage.130 By definition, information
disclosed to the public or otherwise generally known by persons who may
obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information can-
not constitute a trade secret.13 1 Computer software is well-suited for trade
secret protection because a trade secret encompasses the underlying con-
cepts of an invention or process in addition to the specific expression of
those concepts.13 2 Prior to the enactment of the 1980 software amend-
ments and the development of patent protection for computer software,
the law of trade secrets afforded the basic foundation for safeguarding
computer software.1 33 The relatively broad trade secret protection gave
the holder the right to grant licenses to use either the concept or the
application without the loss of protected rights.'
3 4
Trade secret protection differs in several respects from the safety af-
forded by patent and copyright laws. Patent and copyright law are gov-
erned by federal law; trade secret protection is governed by state law. In
addition, patent and copyright laws protect, through the grant of limited
monopoly power, the developer's interest in the computer software while
allowing society to benefit from the dissemination of valuable informa-
tion.1 35 Trade secret law, in contrast, serves to maintain secrecy and
thereby retain the exclusive right to the technology for the software
developer.1
3 6
2. Scope of Trade Secret Protection
Trade secret protection is founded on principles of contract law and
generally exists in the form of contractual covenants in employment and
license agreements restricting the unauthorized transfer, use, or disclo-
130. REsTATEMENr OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (this Restatement section also suggests
six factors for determining whether information may receive protection as a trade secret).
Section 1 of the Uniform Act refined the Restatement definition and provides in part:
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compila-
tion, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
UNIFORM Acr, § 1(4).
Applying such a definition, courts have found that chemical formulas, industrial
processes, pricing information and data base information such as customer lists constitute
trade secrets under the proper factual circumstances. Selinger, supra note 3, at 80-81.
131. UNIFORM ACr, § 1(4)(i).
132. See ILG Indust., Inc. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393, 395 (Ill. 1971); MIGRiM, TRADE SEcRErs,
§ 2 at 26 (1980).
133. See MACs a-r. AL, supra note 24, at 301; Areaux, supra note 8, at 319; see aLso Selinger,
supra note 3, at 81 (Before the enactment of 17 U.S.C. § 301, trade secrets were recognized
either as a complement to copyright protection or the sole form of protection for software).
134. Management Science Am. v. Cyberg Sys., Inc., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. 921 (N.D.
Ill. 1978). See David Bender, Protection of Computer Programs: The Copyright/Trade Secret Inter-
face, 47 U. Prrr. L REv. 907, 938 (1986) (trade secret licensing has become widespread on
both a domestic and international basis).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 148-56.
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sure of the software.13 7 The software owner gains several advantages by
utilizing trade secret protection, whether as the sole form of protection or
a complement to another method. 138 The primary strength of trade se-
cret protection is that it gives the owner the ability to protect both unpub-
lished programs and the underlying ideas and concepts embodied in the
algorithm.13 9 Provided the requisite secrecy is maintained, the holder
benefits because the indefinite duration of protection for trade secrets ex-
ceeds the statutory limits associated with patent and copyright
protection. 140
The trade secret approach does, however, have some basic disadvan-
tages.14 1 Perhaps the most problematic drawback is the difficulty in estab-
lishing and maintaining secrecy. 142 Although the standards for
determining issues such as the loss of secrecy vary by jurisdiction,
143 it
appears universally true that proprietors lose trade secret protection once
the information enters the public domain. Software owners therefore
must usually rule out the potential for wide distribution of computer pro-
grams under this approach; generally, only software developers engaging
in limited distribution benefit from trade secret protection.' 44 In addi-
tion, proprietors may lose the secrecy element through employee turno-
ver. 145 Detection of this form of misappropriation remains difficult and
software employers rarely win lawsuits against former employees. 146 Pro-
prietors should therefore secure nondisclosure contracts or noncompeti-
tion agreements from key employees.'
47
3. Licensing and Internal Protection of Trade Secrets
Trade secret information can be licensed, but the potential licensor
must incorporate provisions in the agreement that are not characteristic of
a patent or copyright license. Trade secret licensing requires additional
consideration because the secret nature of the underlying information dif-
fers from the public material embodied in a patent or copyright license. A
trade secret license agreement must include provisions for the mainte-
nance of secrecy and non-disclosure in relation to the subject matter of
137. Kesler & Hardy, supra note 16, at 267; see infra text accompanying notes 179-80.
138. Dorr & Eigles, supra note 1, at 12 (noting the use of trade secret protection in con-
junction with copyright law).
139. See id at 13; Root, supra note 8, at 226.
140. Trade secrets have an indefinite, and possibly perpetual, term. DoRt & MUNcH,
supra note 38, § 1.7, at 9. See Dorr & Eigles, supra note 1, at 12-13; 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988)
(copyright endures during author's life plus fifty years, or if the copyright owner is a corpora-
tion, for a term of seventy-five years after the year of first publication); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988)
(patent protection endures for a period of 17 years).
141. Kesler & Hardy, supra note 16, at 267.
142. See Selinger, supra note 3, at 86; Root, supra note 8, at 227.
143. Kesler & Hardy, supra note 16, at 267. This problem increases in importance when
applied on an international scale. Id
144. Root, supra note 8, at 227.
145. See Selinger, supra note 3, at 86; Root, supra note 8, at 227.
146. Root, supra note 8, at 227.
147. For a discussion of several preventive measures, see Selinger, supra note 3, at 86; see
infta text accompanying notes 149-54; see also Bender, supra note 134 (trade secret licensing
widespread).
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the agreement, whether the subject matter concerns general customer in-
formation or software-specific material. 148 Notwithstanding the decision
to license trade secret information, the proprietor business must continu-
ally protect the trade secret from misappropriation.
The implementation of a comprehensive internal trade secret pro-
gram weighs strongly in favor of the business when the court addresses a
misappropriation claim against an outsider or former employee. 149 Not
surprisingly, the failure to exercise effective control over corporate trade
secrets or the inability to demonstrate such control will likely result in the
loss of trade secret protection. 150 The basic elements of a corporate trade
secret program should include: (1) physically securing business opera-
tions from outsiders; 15 1 (2) controlling access by suppliers, vendors and
visitors; 152 (3) creating "technological fingerprints";15 and (4) properly
marking and categorizing documents.
154
A planned business program focuses on securing trade secret infor-
mation from external forces. Perhaps the greatest risk of trade secret
theft, however, involves materials and knowledge possessed by existing em-
ployees.1 55 The protection of the business's trade secrets, therefore, con-
stitutes an essential part of the contractual employment agreement,
whether the employee serves in a managerial or technical position.
156
4. Federal Preemption of State Trade Secret Law
The possibility of federal preemption remains the major obstacle con-
cerning the use of state trade secret protection for computer software.
157
Under the federal preemption doctrine, when Congress manifests an in-
tent to regulate a specific field of commercial activity, the courts construe
the federal statute to prevent the states from enacting legislation or
148. HOWARD C. ANAWALT & ELIZABETH F. ENAYATI, 1991 LICENSING LAW HANDBOOK
§ 4.03[4], at 210 (1991).
149. See DoRR & MuNCH, supra note 38, § 1.9, at 11.
150. Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 12. Security measures include electronic surveillance, document destruction/
retention programs, employee access procedures and the use of restricted areas. Id. at 12-13.
152. I. at 12. Businesses should enforce a single entrance/exit policy and utilize a "log-
in" procedure requiring visitors, vendors and repair and service personnel to provide basic
information concerning the nature of their visit. If an outsider requires access to sensitive
areas, businesses should consider the use of "visitor agreements" concerning trade secret
protection. Id. at 13-15.
153. Id. at 12. The incorporation of intentional mistakes and buried instructions or iden-
tifiers in software programs provide evidence of misappropriation in subsequent litigation.
I. at 17.
154. Id. at 12. Businesses should identify material using a trade secret legend in order to
protect the ideas and concepts contained in the document. The expression embodied in the
particular document should also receive the overlapping protection of federal copyright law.
Id. at 15.
155. Id. at 18.
156. See id. at 18-29 (providing detailed guidance for employee-related protective meas-
ures including pre-employment clearance, employee education, termination procedures, and
the use of covenants not to compete).
157. Bender, supra note 134, at 924. For an extensive analysis of the federal preemption
issue, including discussions of the relevant case law and legislative history, see Bender, supra
note 134; Selinger, supra note 3.
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promulgating regulations in that field. 158 The federal Copyright Act,
through the application of Section 301, thus preempts all state law relating
to copyright or any exclusive right otherwise within the scope of federal
copyright protection.
159
The majority view maintains, however, that Section 301 of the federal
Copyright Act fails to pre-empt most of state trade secret law, at least as it
applies to computer software.16  The majority position contends that the
law of trade secrets, in most of its manifestations, does not satisfy two of
the three preemption conditions set forth in Section 301: "equivalency,
subject matter type, and subject matter aspect. " 16 1 Computer software
clearly constitutes a literary work for the purposes of Sections 101 and 102
and thus meets the requirement of "subject matter type." An analysis of
the remaining two preemption conditions reveals differences in the pro-
tection afforded by copyright and trade secret law that weigh against a
determination of preemption.
162
First, trade secret rights are generally not "equivalent" to the rights
protected by federal copyright law because the two forms of protection
differ in relation to the conduct prohibited and the classes of persons
whose acts are proscribed.16 3 With respect to prohibited conduct, the
Copyright Act forbids the unauthorized copying of the author's work,
while state trade secret law prevents the wrongful disclosure or use of
trade secrets. 64 Although the delineation concerning the classes of pro-
scribed persons remains less clear, authors may generally secure copyright
protection against persons engaging in the prohibited conduct.165 Trade
secret protection, in contrast, is available only against persons placing
158. Dorr & Eigles, supra note 1, at 12.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988) provides in relevant part:
(a) On or afterJanuary 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion and come within the subject matter or copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or un-
published, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to
any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or stat-
utes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common
law or statutes of any State with respect to-
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in
any tangible medium of expression; or
(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before January
1, 1978; or
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106.
160. Bender, supra note 134, at 936.
161. Id. at 936-37.
162. Id at 937.
163. Id. See Selinger, supra note 3, at 85 (the trade requirement involving the breach of a
confidence or improper acquisition defines rights that are qualitatively different from those
provided by the federal copyright laws).
164. Bender, supra note 134, at 937.
165. Id.
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themselves in a confidential, contractual or fiduciary relationship with the
proprietor of the trade secret.
166
Second, copyright and trade secret laws differ concerning the requi-
site "subject matter aspect." Federal copyright protection extends only to
the author's expression, not the concepts and information embodied in
the expression. State trade secret law, however, constitutes a viable means
of protecting the underlying ideas, algorithms, concepts and principles
embodied in the expression, which in this case is the computer
software. 1
67
The courts should narrowly construe Section 301 of the federal Copy-
right Act and limit preemption to those instances where trade secret pro-
tection for computer software satisfies the three statutory preemption
conditions. 168 Proprietors currently employ the law of trade secrets to
protect technological and commercial information licensed by, or main-
tained within, the organization. 1 69 If courts readily apply the doctrine in
areas not warranting preemption, including the context of computer
software, owners would lose protection for valuable rights secured by state
law.17
0
II. FACTUAL CONTEXT OF SOFTWARE OWNERSHIP DisPuTEs
A developer or other owner may discover that another person, per-
haps a competitor or former employee, has claimed colorable title to the
owner's proprietary software. This problem will be exacerbated if the of-
fending party has taken action that would lead to the perfection of the
software title. An adverse claimant may seek such perfection of title either
by applying for patent protection or by following the relatively simple
copyright registration procedures, which require the placement of a copy-
right legend on the program. An adverse claimant may also establish a
colorable interest by simply incorporating the software into his operation,
treating it as proprietary, and claiming trade secret protection.
Persons or entities may assert colorable title in a number of ways.
Among these might be the following hypothetical situations: (a) a previous
owner of the "protected property" might claim a retention of rights in the
property, predicating such claim on a faulty sale process; (b) a program-
mer who worked on the development of the software might contend that
he or she was engaged under terms of the engagement as an independent
contractor relationship rather than as an employee, that the terms of the
engagement contract called for delivery of a product other than the
software in question, and that, he or she therefore retained the ownership
rights in that software; (c) a former employee may argue that the key de-
166. 1d
167. Dorr & Eigles, supra note 1, at 12; Bender, supra note 134, at 937.
168. Id. at 938.
169. Id (quoting Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971)). Proprietors
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velopment work leading to the final product was done off-site and on his
or her own time, and that the associated work product was merely shared
with the employer to facilitate the employer's then-current needs. While
there are undoubtedly many other scenarios giving rise to claims of colora-
ble title, each of the foregoing illustrates a circumstance giving rise to the
need to establish marketable title.
Since the disclosure and publication requirements associated with
patent and copyright law may reduce or destroy the value of otherwise
'secret" business assets, patents and copyrights may fail as preventive meas-
ures where the owner of confidential software technology desires to main-
tain secrecy. The title issue thus concerns the ability of a proprietary
software owner to preserve secrets associated with the software or other-
wise resolve the question of ownership after the breach of the secrecy.
Declaratory judgment proceedings or state statutes that extend quiet title
actions to disputes involving personal property constitute means of resolv-
ing such questions of software ownership.
III. TRADITIONAL QUIET TrrLE ACTIONS
A. Nature and Purpose
The best approach to resolving ownership disputes concerning real
property is to bring an action requesting the court to "quiet the title" to
the property. The effect of such a "quiet title" action is two-fold: (1) it
judicially defines the instant ownership of the property; and (2) it "cuts-
off" future adverse claims of ownership. 17 1 When properly brought before
the court, the joined parties may fully litigate the question of title and
define their respective rights in relation to the property as of the time that
the plaintiff brought the action. 17 2 The court enters a decree assigning
the title, or any part thereof, to the property in controversy to the party
holding the superior claim.1
7 3
The court, however, will generally not address ancillary issues174 such
as the rights of persons not joined as parties 175 or the validity of title pro-
ceedings originating in another court. 176 Furthermore, the court will not
examine the validity of alleged "clouds" on a title where it appears that,
even if such "clouds" were removed, title would still lie in the
defendant.177
Although the nature of a quiet title action appears to provide an "eq-
uitable" remedy, matters affecting title to realty constitute actions "in law,"
and historically courts of equity lacked jurisdiction to effect title. As a re-
sult, quiet title actions are generally deemed to lie in equity only when it
171. Rawlinson v. Oregon Textile Mach., 99 P.2d 999 (Or. 1940).
172. Stricker Land & Timber Co. v. Hogue, 61 F. Supp. 825 (D. La. 1945).
173. Dolen v. Black, 67 N.W. 760 (Neb. 1896).
174. Snook & Wells v. Holmes, 193 P.2d 487 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1948).
175. Bray v. Germain Inv. Co., 98 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1940); Turner v. Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n, 27 P.2d 383 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
176. Woods v. Monroe, 17 Mich. 238 (1868).
177. Masterson v. Cranitch, 19 N.Y. Wkly. Dig. 55 (1883).
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otherwise would be necessary to bring multiple suits in order to achieve
the desired "quieting."
"Quiet title" suits are therefore legal actions which must be supported
by statute, and all federal and state jurisdictions have enacted appropriate
enabling legislation or court rules. Although the quiet title provisions are
not uniform in every jurisdiction, each provides claimants with a vehicle
for curing technical failures of record title by supplying the missing con-
nection in a derivative chain of title. In addition, holders of property may
seek quiet title decrees in an effort to establish record ownership after
obtaining legal title through foreclosure or adverse possession.'
78
Notwithstanding a claimant's particular reason for initiating an action,
however, statutes and rules allowing suits to quiet title eliminate the need
for multiple petitions and provide a single form of action to adjudicate the
ownership rights concerning a specific parcel of property.
B. Statutory Authority
As a threshold matter, claimants must examine the statute or rule gov-
erning quiet title actions in the controlling jurisdiction in order to deter-
mine the scope of the proceeding and remedy. Quiet title legislation
generally provides only a rule of procedure for determining parties' re-
spective rights under a substantive provision, rather than creating substan-
tive rights. 179 In addition, the majority of jurisdictions limits quiet title
actions to disputes concerning real property, and courts generally allow
quiet title actions to resolve personal property disputes only where author-
ized by statute or court rule or, because of exceptional circumstances or
conditions, the remedy at law would prove inadequate.' 80
Claimants must examine the statute controlling quiet title actions
within the jurisdiction in order to determine which court holds the au-
thority to adjudicate issues of title.1 8 1 Such an examination will also iden-
tify the nature of, and limits upon, quiet title proceedings within that
jurisdiction.18 2 Modern courts do not hear a large number of quiet title
178. In fact, such a use of the action is classic, in those instances wherein the legal title
holder's right to possession of the property is challenged by another. In this regard, the
Colorado enabling statute is typical:
An action may be brought for the purpose of obtaining a complete adjudication of
the rights of all parties thereto, with respect to any real property and for damages, if
any, for the withholding of possession. The court in its decree shall grant full and
adequate relief so as to completely determine the controversy and enforce the
rights of the parties. The court may at any time after the entry of the decree make
such additional orders as may be required in aid of such decree.
CoLo. R. Civ. P. 105(a) (1988).
179. See WILLIS V. CARPENTER, COLORADO REAL ESTATE PRACnCE 1992, ch. 14, at 478
(1992).
180. See Carter Oil Co. v. Owen, 27 F. Supp. 74 (D. I1. 1939); Ellis v. Dixie Highway
Special Road & Bridge Dist., 138 So. 374 (Fla. 1931).
181. See Martin v. Pacific Southwest Royalties, 106 P.2d 443 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1940).
182. While the enabling statutes vary in scope and detail, one or more courts within a
jurisdiction hold the power to: (1) determine all the rights and claims of the parties relating
to the subject matter in controversy; and (2) make such disposition of the case as will afford
complete relief in order to safeguard the interests of all the parties. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§§ 760.010-764.010 (West 1992) (procedural requirements).
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suits and generally confine the actions to the determination of existing
rights18 3 in particular property when the system of recordation of title has
failed.
18 4
The enabling statutes that control quiet title actions within the several
states vary in detail, but some level of court in most jurisdictions is given
the power to "determine all the rights and claims of the parties relating to
the subject matter [concerning the issue of title] and make such disposi-
tion of the case as will afford complete relief in order to safeguard the
interests of all the parties."185 This statutory language ordinarily means
that the court is empowered to act as necessary to define the title, estate




Of primary importance to disputes concerning the ownership of com-
puter software is whether the relevant authority allows actions to quiet title
to personal property. On the federal level, quiet title actions proceed
under the Quiet Title Act, 18 7 which established a procedure similar to
those developed by the majority of the states. The procedure available
under the Quiet Title Act is expressly limited to disputes concerning real
property; the procedure is not available to resolve controversies involving
personal property. l8 8 The Act establishes a basis for the adjudication of
title only when the claimant names the United States as a defendant.' 89
These restrictions preclude the application of the federal statute to dis-
putes concerning the ownership of computer software.
2. State Law
Although virtually every state has enacted some form of quiet title
legislation or court rule, each statute or rule varies in terms of scope and
procedure. The clear majority of state jurisdictions limit the availability of
quiet title actions to controversies involving the title to real property, 190
but some states expressly allow quiet title actions for personal property. 19
183. Victoria Hosp. Assoc. v. All Persons, 147 P. 124 (Cal. 1915).
184. Taylor v. Focks Drilling & Manuf. Corp., 62 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1936).
185. Kellogg v. Schaueble, 273 F. 1012 (D. Miss. 1921).
186. Milton E. Giles & Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 117 P.2d 943 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1941); Goodfellow v. Barritt, 20 P.2d 740 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
187. 28 U.S.C. 2409(a) (1988).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Colorado's rule governing quiet title actions is illustrative of the majority position.
Rule 105 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
An action may be brought for the purpose of obtaining a complete adjudication of
the rights of all parties thereto, with respect to any real property and for damages, if
any, for the withholding of possession. The court in its decree shall grant full and
adequate relief so as to completely determine the controversy and enforce the
rights of the parties. The court may at any time after the entry of the decree make
such additional orders as may be required in aid of such decree.
CoLo. R. Crv. P. 105 (1988) (emphasis added).
191. Utah's quiet tide statute is representative of the minority position. That statute pro-
vides that:
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In those jurisdictions which have extended the legal remedy to encompass
personal property, purported owners of computer software may use these
broad-based statutory provisions in cases involving adverse claims to
software. Other states have addressed the issue by enacting a statutory
scheme with a separate provision governing controversies involving per-
sonal property.
192
C. Need for an Alternative Method of Resolution
In instances where the owner of confidential software technology
desires to maintain secrecy, the disclosure and publication requirements
associated with patent and copyright law may destroy the value of the
property. In these cases, the use of patents and copyrights fails as an effec-
tive method of ownership control. The concern in this situation involves
the ability of the owner of proprietary software to either preserve secrets
associated with the software or otherwise resolve the question of owner-
ship once the sought-after secrecy has been breached. State statutes that
extend quiet tide actions to disputes involving personal property consti-
tute a means of resolving such questions of software ownership.
D. Procedural Issues
In order to prevail in a quiet title action, most statutes require the
claimant to demonstrate vested title on the strength of his or her own
claim, rather than on the weakness of the defendant's right or tide.
193 If
neither party carries the burden of establishing title, the court will likely
refuse to quiet the title in the name of either party. Although such action
will result in the denial of relief, the court subordinates the societal inter-
est in clarifying ownership rights to prevent an inequitable resolution of
the controversy.
The California quiet title statute, which allows the court to decide
adverse claims to personal property, provides a procedural model for
resolving potential software disputes. 19 4 California's rules of civil proce-
dure govern such requirements unless the applicable statute or rule specif-
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or
interest in real property or claim to personal property adverse to him, for the purpose
of determining such adverse claim.
UTAH COnE ANN. § 78-40-1 (1992) (emphasis added); see also CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE
§ 760.020(a) (West 1992) and IDAHO CODE § 6-401 (1992).
192. For example, the Montana code provides in relevant part:
Any person claiming title to personal property, whether in actual possession thereof or
not, may bring an action in the district court of any county wherein such personal
property or any part thereof is situated against any person or persons claiming any
interest therein by reason of alleged ownership... and by a decree of such court
may have established and determined finally the rights of all claimants to such per-
sonal property.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-2-201 (1991) (emphasis added).
193. See CARENTER, supra note 179, at 479.
194. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 760.010-.060 (West Supp. 1993).
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ically prescribes an alternative forum. 195 As in any civil suit, the plaintiff
must adhere to the relevant pleading 19 6 and service 19 7 requirements and
bring the quiet title action in the appropriate jurisdiction and venue.' 9 8
The plaintiff must also join the relevant parties, whether known or un-
known,1 9 9 when filing the complaint or risk the imposition of limitations
195. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 760.060 (West Supp. 1993) provides that "[t]he statutes and
rules governing practice in civil actions generally apply to actions under this chapter except
where they are inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter."
196. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 761.020 (West 1992) provides in part:
The complaint shall be verified and shall include all of the following:
(a) A description of the property that is the subject of the action. In the case
of tangible personal property, the description shall include its usual location ...
(b) The title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is
sought and the basis of the tide...
(c) The adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determina-
tion is sought.
(d) The date as of which the determination is sought. If the determination is
sought as of a date other than the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall
include a statement of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought.
(e) A prayer for the determination of the tide of the plaintiff against the ad-
verse claims.
The defendant's answer must include: (1) any claims by the defendant; (2) any facts tending
to controvert the plaintiffs allegations; and (3) a statement of any new matter constituting a
defense. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 761.030 (West Supp. 1993). The defendant may also seek
affirmative relief by filing a cross-complaint in the action. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 761.040
(West Supp. 1993).
197. For an example of a typical service requirement, see CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 763.010
(West Supp. 1993).
198. The California Code also provides an example of the jurisdiction and venue require-
ments. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 760.040 (West 1992) (entitled "Jurisdiction; equitable relief")
provides:
(a) The superior court has jurisdiction of actions under this chapter.
(b) The court has complete jurisdiction over the parties to the action and the
property described in the complaint and is deemed to have obtained possession and
control of the property for the purposes of the action with complete jurisdiction to
render the judgment provided for in this chapter.
(c) Nothing in this chapter limits any authority the court may have to grant
such equitable relief as may be proper under the circumstances of the case.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 760.050 (West Supp. 1993) (entitled "Venue") provides in part:
Subject to the power of the court to transfer actions, the proper county for the trial
of an action under this chapter is:
(b) Where the subject of the action is personal property, the county in which the
personal property is principally located at the commencement of the action or in
which the defendants, or any of them, reside at the commencement of the action.
199. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 762.010 (West Supp. 1993) provides "[tihe plaintiff shall
name as defendants in the action persons having adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff
against which a determination is sought." CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 762.020 (West Supp. 1993)
provides in relevant part that "(a) If the name of a person required to be named as a defend-
ant is not known to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall so state in the complaint and shall name as
parties all persons unknown in the manner provided in Section 762.060." In turn, CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 762.020 (West 1992) provides in part:
(a) In addition to the persons required to be named as defendants in the ac-
tion, the plaintiff may name as defendants "all persons unknown, claiming any legal
or equitable right, tide ... or interest in the property described in the complaint
adverse to plaintiff's title, or any cloud upon plaintiff's title thereto," naming them
in that manner.
(b) In an action under this section, the plaintiff shall name as defendants the
persons having adverse claims that are of record or known to the plaintiff...
(c) If the plaintiff admits the validity of any adverse claim, the complaint shall
so state.
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on the resulting title.200 The aggrieved party bears the burden of estab-
lishing colorable title to the software by presenting testimony of product
developers and key employees and by producing relevant documents, in-
cluding the software codes.
20 1
The court will dispose of the claims in a manner that affords complete
relief to the aggrieved party within the scope of the pleadings. 20 2 If prop-
erly raised by the pleadings, the parties may fully litigate the question of
software title according to the existing conditions and rights to the prod-
uct.203 The court, however, will only make a determination of superior
title as it relates to the named parties, 20 4 with the result that strangers to
the proceeding may hold the "true" title to the subject software.
20 5
E. Potential Resolution and Effect
An increased application of the quiet title action to challenges con-
cerning title to personal property would allow attorneys to resolve disputes
concerning software protected by any of the three traditional methods.
Owners could seek to quiet title to software otherwise protected by a pat-
ent or copyright if the statutory remedies proved inadequate. Perhaps of
greater importance, however, is the potential effectiveness of the quiet ti-
tle action in software disputes based on the misappropriation of trade
secrets. Owners of proprietary software who had relied solely on trade
200. CAL. CIV. PROc. CODE § 762.040 (West 1992).
201. The court renders judgment in accordance with the evidence and law. See CAL. Crv.
PROC. CODE § 764.010 (West Supp. 1993).
202. See id
203. CAL Crv. PROC. CODE § 760.030 (West Supp. 1993) provides:
(a) The remedy provided in this chapter is cumulative and not exclusive of any
other remedy, form or right of action, or proceeding provided by law for establish-
ing or quieting title to property.
(b) In an action or proceeding in which establishing or quieting title to prop-
erty is in issue the court in its discretion may, upon motion of any party, require that
the issue be resolved pursuant to the provisions of this chapter to the extent
practicable.
CAL. CMv. PROC. CODE § 764.010 (West 1992) provides for a hearing in which the court exam-
ines and determines the plaintiffs title against the claims of the defendant. The court ren-
ders its judgment in accordance with the evidence and law. Id.
204. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 764.030 (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added) provides:
The judgment in the action is binding and conclusive on all of the following persons,
regardless of any legal disability:
(a) All persons known and unknown who were parties to the action and who
have any claim to the property, whether present or future, vested or contingent,
legal or equitable, several or undivided.
(b) Except as provided in Section 764.045, all persons who were not parties to
the action and who have any claim to the property which was not of record at the
time the lis pendens was filed or, if none was filed, at the time the judgment was
recorded.
205. CAL. CIM. PROC. CODE § 764.045 (West Supp. 1993) provides in part:
[T] he judgment does not affect a claim in the property or part thereof of any person
who was not a party to the action if any of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) The claim was of record at the time the lis pendens was filed or, if none was
filed, at the time the judgment was recorded.
(b) The claim was actually known to the plaintiff.... Nothing in this subdivi-
sion shall be construed to impair the rights of a bonafide purchaser or encum-
brancer for value dealing with the plaintiff or the plaintiffs successors in interest.
Although this provision is more relevant to actions concerning real property, by definition
the statute could apply to actions involving personal property.
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secret protection could avail themselves of a cost-effective procedure to
resolve the question of ownership when a challenge arose. Moreover, the
quiet tide action may serve as a precursor to securing patent or copyright
protection.
IV. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS
A. Nature and Purpose
Although a "restricted" quiet title jurisdiction may preclude an ag-
grieved software owner from initiating a quiet title proceeding, a declara-
tory judgment action will most likely be available to the owner. Similar to
the quiet title action, a declaratory judgment ruling defines the relative
rights of the disputing parties with respect to the property at issue.
20 6
When the underlying dispute concerns rights of ownership, the declara-
tory judgment proceeding allows the parties to effectively adjudicate their
alleged ownership interests in the same manner as a quiet title action.
20 7
The declaratory judgment action differs in some respects from the
quiet title proceeding. In a quiet title action, the plaintiff seeks to prevent
a prospective interloper from taking financial advantage of his or her pre-
vious access to the "secret." The quiet title plaintiff's desire to take action
will most often arise before the interloper has demonstrated any solid in-
tent to benefit from the prior access. In such a situation, a court has noth-
ing to consider with respect to a "quieting of the title" because there is
nothing to "quiet" unless and until there is a colorable challenge to the
ownership of the property.20 8 An action for a declaratory judgment, on
the other hand, is not limited in this respect, because the purpose of the
action is to allow the court to determine the rights of the parties.
20 9
206. The Colorado enabling statute, similar to § 1 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act is typical: "Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions have power to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed."
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-51-105 (1987). For interpretation of this portion of the Act, see Lane
v. Page, 251 P.2d 1078 (Colo. 1952).
207. That is, as it applies here, insofar as the ownership interests in question arose as a
result of a contractual relationship between the parties. The Colorado enabling statute, simi-
lar to § 2 of the Uniform DeclaratoryJudgment Act is typical: "Any person interested under a
deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract . .. may have deter-
mined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument... [or] contract
... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder." COLO.
REv. STAT. § 13-51-106 (1987). This application lies in the present instance because of the
provision following: "A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a
breach thereof." COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-51-107 (1987); similar to § 3 of the Uniform Declara-
tory Judgment Act. For a specific example of an adjudication of contractual rights prior to
breach, see Hartford Ins. Group v. District Ct. for the Fourth Jud. Dist., 625 P.2d 1013 (Colo.
1981).
208. This consequence springs from the fact that a decree to quiet tide is in fact a decree
to define relative ownership rights, and where the court is unable to decide the question of
those relative ownership rights, such a decree is improper. Citizen's State Bank of Waterville,
Kan. v. Paul, 239 P. 880 (1925).
209. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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B. Declaratory Judgments in Federal Court
Declaratory judgment actions are controlled within the federal courts
by Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Declaratory judgments
may be brought "between citizens of different states," under the authority
enumerated in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. Congress,
acting under that grant of authority, has determined that a citizen of one
state can bring action against a citizen in another state under this "diver-
sityjurisdiction" of the federal courts if the controversy arose from a cause
of action grounded in state law and if the damages claimed are in excess of
a statutory amount.2 10 Currently, the "amount-in-controversy" require-
ment is $50,000,211 which the purported owner will likely establish in the
situation where there was substantial "secondary" activity affecting the
trade secret.
The lack of a colorable challenge to tide, however, may serve as a bar
to a declaratoryjudgment action in federal court as a result of the "case or
controversy" requirement of the United States Constitution.2 12 Under this
clause, the federal courts may only hear those matters that have matured
into an actual controversy. Since the usual software tide dispute does not
present a defined controversy, a declaratory judgment action will probably
not lie for such matters in the federal courts. Plaintiffs, however, could
bring the majority, if not all, of those actions in state court, because all
states have statutes in place enabling the courts to determine and define
rights before a controversy actually arises.
C. Declaratory Judgments in State Court
States have enacted their own statutes authorizing declaratory judg-
ment actions, and a potential plaintiff would look to the enabling statute
in the applicable jurisdiction in order to determine the scope and form of
the action. The first step in such an examination would be to determine
whether the jurisdiction imposed a "case or controversy" limitation as
found in the federal constitution. 2 13 The majority of the state constitu-
tions contain no such limitation.
2 14
Second, the potential plaintiff must examine the jurisdiction's rule
concerning declaratory judgment actions. Each state has enacted its own
statute authorizing declaratory judgment actions, but most of the state en-
abling statutes, unlike those enabling quiet title actions, are modeled after
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.
2 15
210. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
212. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
213. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
214. For example, the Colorado Constitution allows courts increased latitude in ac-
cepting cases and an action seeking such a declaration need not be delayed until the owner
has suffered, or is about to suffer, damages as a result of the compromise of the trade secret.
COLO. RL Civ. P. 57(c) (1988) (stating that "[a] contract may be construed either before or
after there has been a breach thereof").
215. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988). The enabling statute in Colorado, which was revised in
1973 to conform with the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, is typical of the state provi-
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The potential plaintiff's ability to bring a declaratory judgment action
depends on whether the complaint implicates an issue arising out of a
contract.2 1 6 This should not present an overwhelming problem, however,
because almost every fact scenario giving rise to the type of software dis-
pute under consideration involves access to a trade secret that was prohib-
ited by contract. Since the "cloud" on the title most likely arose when a
contractual relationship existed, the owner will probably not be precluded
from bringing a declaratory judgment action.
2 17
D. Jurisdiction Over the Parties
The nature of actions affecting either title to personal property, such
as the monopolistic right to software technology, or rights under a con-
tract are in personam actions rather than in rem proceedings, such as the
adjudication of title to real estate. As a result, a court will only adjudicate
a matter with respect to the parties properly before the court. If a declara-
toryjudgment action is to be effective in determining title, the owner of
the software should first identify all potential "problem" sources or de-
fendants, including entities whose claim to the secret might exist as a re-
sult of a "secondary contact" with the party causing the original
problem.2 18 Only by joining these persons or entities as parties in the
action can the owner ensure that each of the sources of future "problems"
are bound by the outcome of the suit.
Once all the potential sources of "clouds" on the title are identified
and enjoined, the next matter concerns the determination of whether the
court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants. 21 9 In most cases, the
sions. The statute, which was incorporated into the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure states in
part:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings consti-
tuting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a
•.. contract... may have determined any question of construction or validity aris-
ing under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a
declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.
COLO. Rav. STAT. § 13-51-101 (1987); COLO. R Civ. P. 57(b) (1988).
216. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
217. The language of the Colorado rule, as adapted from the Uniform Act, suggests its
application in this context. The provision states in part, "[t]his Rule is declared to be reme-
dial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to
rights, status, and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered."
COLO. R. Civ. P. 57(k) (1988) (emphasis added).
218. The language of the Colorado statute as adapted from section 11 of the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act reads as follows: "When declaratory relief is sought, all persons
shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declara-
tion, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding."
COLO. RFv. STAT. § 13-51-115 (1987).
219. The Supreme Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment to establish the principal
that a given court must have personal jurisdiction over the parties in order that action or-
dered by that court have validity:
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the
validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the
State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court ofjustice to determine the
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction
do not constitute due process of law.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
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court will have personal jurisdiction because the fact scenarios involving
software disputes result from the in-state domicile or other presence of the
defendant. If such a basis for jurisdiction does not exist in a given situa-
tion, it is difficult to imagine a situation that would give rise to a "cloud on
the title" which would not also give rise to the forum state having personal
jurisdiction over the defendant based on "minimum contacts." This would
certainly be true for all claimants to colorable title whose claim springs
from personal contact with the owner of the software. However, an owner
seeking to adjudicate his or her claim of superior title may have difficulty
obtaining personal jurisdiction over "derivative" or secondary claimants.
Absent the sufficient "presence" of the potential defendant in the fo-
rum state to establish jurisdiction of the courts of that state over the per-
son of the "interloper," the owner may use the state's "long-arm" statute to
establish the requisite jurisdiction. Such statutes, which grew out of the
Supreme Court's holding in International Shoe v. Washington,2 20 represent
the state legislatures' attempts to grant to their respective state courts the
power to "reach out" and exercise jurisdiction over parties who do not
otherwise maintain a sufficiently strong "presence" in the state to justify
personal jurisdiction. The problem such statutes present in the situation
currently under consideration is that, in order to establish jurisdiction,
they generally require either "tortious conduct" toward the plaintiff citizen
or a sustained economic presence within the state. In other words, the
statute requires the existence of the very situation that the owner either
does not want-prior damage as a result of a breach of the secret-or may
not have-a provable, sustained financial tie to the State.
CONCLUSION AND PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE
Software developers traditionally employ one or more of three con-
ventional methods of safeguarding ownership rights to computer software-
patent, copyright and trade secret protection. The benefits derived from
each form of protection depend largely on the owner's needs and the spe-
cific nature and application of the software. 221 Attorneys should therefore
consider the following factors when developing a package of protection
for computer software:
(1) The target market. If the owner intends to produce the prod-
uct for general distribution, the attorney should consider patent
and copyright protection. If the only concern, however, is the in-
house use of a proprietary software package, the attorney should
recommend trade secret protection to safeguard the owner's
interests.
(2) The importance of the underlying algorithm. The owner may con-
sider securing a patent as a means of complementing another
form of protection or otherwise restricting the market to facili-
tate effective trade secret protection.
220. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
221. Selinger, supra note 3, at 66.
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(3) The costs and benefits associated with each form of protection. The
attorney must consider the intended use of the software and allo-
cate the client's resources efficiently.
222
If the selected method of protection fails, the attorney should con-
sider initiating a quiet title action or seeking a declaratory judgment as a
means of resolving the question of software ownership. Because of the
statutory limitations in the majority of jurisdictions concerning personal
property claims, however, attorneys may not implement the quiet title ac-
tion as a universal approach to resolving software ownership disputes. Ac-
cordingly, just as attorneys evaluate relevant factors in selecting the means
of protecting computer software, counsel should weigh the following ele-
ments when considering an action to quiet software title:
(1) The scope of the applicable statute or court rule in the relevant juris-
diction. The threshold inquiry concerns whether the existing
source allows, by the language of the statute or judicial interpre-
tation, an action to quiet title to personal property.
(2) The procedural requirements. The attorney must adhere to the
procedural rules concerning pleadings, venue and joinder of
parties.
(3) The effect of an action to quiet title. The court will characterize
the result in terms of superior title by limiting the title determi-
nation to the joined parties, in contrast to awarding absolute ti-
tle, which would foreclose unknown adversary interests.
A distinct minority of jurisdictions currently allow adverse claimants
to initiate quiet title actions involving personal property. The widespread
availability of the quiet title action as a means of resolving software owner-
ship disputes therefore rests primarily with the majority of state legisla-
tures and judiciaries. Unless state legislatures and courts expand the
scope of the quiet title action beyond its historical application to interests
in real property, few software owners will realize the relative simplicity and
effectiveness of the procedure.
Although the quiet title approach remains unavailable in a majority of
jurisdictions, each state allows an action for a declaratory judgment, which
defines title to personal property in a manner analogous to the protection
afforded by a quiet title action. The software owner may then use the
declaratory judgment ruling as the foundation for obtaining an injunction
or other appropriate relief against adverse parties making unauthorized
use of the trade secret. In addition, the owner may bring a legal action for
conversion against any unauthorized recipient of the software or any of
the parties to the declaratory judgment proceeding who violate the terms
of the ruling before the owner obtains an injunction. In the rare situation
in which control of the trade secret has eroded to the point that a federal
222. See Root, supra note 8, at 229-30. Considering the ease and scope of protection and
the available remedies, one commentator suggests that attorneys seek copyright protection
for nearly all computer programs. Id. at 229. The author reasons that, even if the owner
employs primary means of coverage other than copyright, the complementary copyright may
prove invaluable because "the client will have erected a foundation of enforceable rights to
fall back upon should those [primary] means fail." Id at 229-30.
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diversity action is both jurisdictionally appropriate and required to protect
the secret, the size of the claim will likely satisfy the federal amount-in-
controversy requirement.
